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Abstract 
The aim of this study was to examine whether motivational orientations for a new motor 
task could be triggered by unconscious determinants. Participants were primed with subliminal 
words depicting an autonomous, a neutral, or a controlled motivation during an initial unrelated 
task, followed by working on an unknown motor task. Behavioral, physiological and self-
reported indicators of motivation for this task were assessed. Overall, results indicated a 
significant impact of the priming condition on all these indicators; while the priming of 
autonomous motivation led to positive outcomes, the priming of controlled motivation led to 
negatives outcomes when compared to the neutral condition. Implications regarding the priming 
of unconscious determinants of motivation for sport and exercise are discussed.  
 
Keywords: motivational orientation; self-determination theory; subliminal priming; unconscious 
processes.
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Most contemporary motivational theories more or less directly rely on what Weiner 
called more than 25 years ago “the godlike metaphor” (Weiner, 1992). This metaphor was used 
to characterize a theoretical assumption that individuals are perfectly rational, all knowing, aware 
of goals and that they are pursuing all possible alternatives to goal-related actions. The Theory of 
Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991) is a striking illustration of such a “rational model”. This theory 
postulates that behaviors are directly predicted by conscious intentions, which are themselves the 
result of a reasoning process based on a set of conscious beliefs. Multiple theories of goal 
pursuits (e.g., Bandura, 1986; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Locke & Latham, 1990) also consider 
that goals are consciously set and require an attentive process of self-regulation. Finally, the Self-
Determination Theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985), which has gained popularity over the last 20 
years and which is widely applied to sport and exercise (see Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2007, for a 
review), also implies such deliberative processes. SDT postulates a distinction among 
motivational orientations depending on the perceived locus of causality which requires a 
conscious evaluation of the situation and of the reasons to act (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Taken 
together, conscious appraisal is presumed to be a fundamental mechanism by the most influential 
motivational theories today. 
However, during the last decade, some theoretical models have emerged from various 
psychological sciences including neuroscience (e.g., Lieberman, 2007), cognitive psychology 
(e.g., Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), social cognition (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004), personality 
(Epstein, 1994) and social psychology (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999), that unanimously 
acknowledge both a conscious and an unconscious system responsible for behavior. Although 
each of these models used different labels to denominate the highlighted systems (e.g., automatic 
vs. controlled, impulsive vs. reflective, hot vs. cool), all of them make a distinction between a 
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system in which cognitive processes are deliberative and mobilize attention and a system in 
which processes are automatically processed outside of awareness. These two systems are 
described as having different operating modes and different functions. Briefly, the conscious 
system generates behavioral decisions based on knowledge about facts and values by using 
semantic processing which requires a high amount of cognitive resources. The unconscious 
system, by contrast, is described as continuously working and able to efficiently process a mass 
of stimuli by using an associative method based on previously established links to elicit 
behaviors. These models assume that while the conscious system seems devoted to learning 
novel behaviors and to managing complex situations, the unconscious system seems, in contrast, 
devoted to managing acquired actions and performing simple actions. Research conducted in 
social psychology has shown that the unconscious system is however not only involved in basic 
cognitive functions but also in higher mental processes, such as social judgment (e.g., Uleman, 
Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996), decision making (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & Van 
Baaren, 2006), and motivational processes (e.g., Bargh, 1997).  
More specifically, with the exception of research on implicit motives (McClelland, 
Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989), the modern investigation of the motivational unconscious has 
mainly focused on the automatization process. The Auto-Motive model was specifically created 
by Bargh (1997) to explain how the unconscious system can take the place of the conscious 
system when a motivational response gets automatized. According to this model, the different 
motivations are represented in memory like any other knowledge, emotions, or attitudes. These 
motivations are connected to other constructs via past experiences. Thus, if people consciously 
select the same motivation in a specific context many times, then a neural connection is created 
between the motivation and any elements of this particular context (Shiffrin & Dumais, 1981). 
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With automatization of this motivation, the motivational process is progressively delegated to the 
unconscious system, which will trigger an automatized motivation every time one of these 
contextual elements is perceived. For example, someone who learned how to swim in a very 
controlling climate (i.e., he/she is pressured by others to go to the swimming pool) may have 
developed over time a controlled motivation for that activity. Consequently, it is likely that every 
time an event related to this activity subsequently occurs in the life of this person (e.g., the sight 
or the smell of a swimming pool), controlled motivation would be automatically 
activated leading him/her to avoid this activity or to approach it only for external reasons. In the 
same vein, because engagement in an activity by choice, interest, or preference is associated over 
time with optimal functioning, any environmental cues which could awake feelings of freedom, 
choice, or volition may entail a positive mindset conducive to adaptive behaviors (e.g., more 
positive attitude towards the task, more effort and more persistence) in subsequent tasks.  
Bargh and his colleagues (e.g., Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 
2001; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996) have experimentally tested the Auto-Motive model using the 
priming paradigm. This paradigm emphasizes the connectionism proprieties of memory to 
unconsciously activate a mental construct by exposing participants to stimuli (i.e., prime) 
connected to the motivational construct of interest. Typically, a priming experiment is divided in 
two successive phases, with the first task devoted to the activation of the construct and the 
second task devoted to the observation of priming consequences. Specifically, the level of 
accessibility of an available construct stored in memory is temporarily raised in the first task 
using related stimuli, so that it can be readily applied to a subsequent situation and influence 
ensuing behaviors, emotions or thoughts. Most of the time, the two tasks are completely 
different, and the experimenter even emphasizes that the two tasks are unrelated as it is important 
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that participants believe that what they perceived in the first task has no influence on what they 
do in the second task. A priming experiment can be either carried out with subliminal or 
supraliminal stimuli (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Subliminal stimuli literally mean stimuli below 
the limen (i.e., the threshold from which individuals can report the perception of the stimuli). 
Thus, in a subliminal priming experiment, participants are exposed to stimuli which are 
physically present but not consciously detected (Dijksterhuis, Aarts, & Smith, 2005). Although 
many subliminal techniques exist, the most common one is to use a very brief exposure to visual 
stimuli. In a supraliminal priming experiment, participants consciously perceive the primes 
during their exposure, but are unaware of the influence that these stimuli have on their behavior.  
Many priming studies provide strong support for the Auto-Motive model, demonstrating 
that motivational goals can be automatically triggered outside of participants’ awareness (see 
Ferguson, Hassin, & Bargh, 2007, for a review). However, previous research has mainly focused 
on proximal goals (e.g., helping others, cleaning, or earning money) and only two articles have 
examined priming of wider motivational orientations like those advocated by SDT (Hodgins, 
Yacko, & Gottlieb, 2006; Lévesque & Pelletier, 2003). More precisely, these studies examined 
the automaticity of autonomous and controlled motivations. According to SDT, an autonomous 
motivation corresponds to an experience of volition and self-endorsement of actions. In other 
words, when people are autonomously motivated, they freely chose to initiate their behavior and 
engage in activities that promote fulfillment of the innate psychological needs for autonomy, 
competence and relatedness. Examples of autonomously motivated behavior would be doing an 
activity on the basis of interest, challenge, positive feelings and growth. By contrast, people who 
have a controlled motivation experience pressure to behave in particular ways. Doing an activity 
for instrumental reasons, such as external rules, or the expectation of a reward rather than for the 
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satisfaction derived from the activity itself are examples of such motivation (Deci & Ryan, 
1985).  
Knowing whether or not these motivational orientations can be unconsciously triggered is 
a very intriguing question. Indeed, ‘autonomous’ and ‘controlled’ motivations are global 
motivational orientations that represent a more general propensity or mindset. There is very 
limited evidence suggesting such abstract motivational constructs are represented in memory. 
Since the representation of a construct in memory is the minimal criterion for automaticity 
(Higgins, 1996), we can wonder whether these motivations can be automatically activated. 
For instance, Lévesque and Pelletier (2003) as well as Hodgins et al. (2006) have primed 
autonomous and controlled motivations via a supraliminal exposition of stimuli. More precisely, 
in these experiments, participants initially completed a scrambled sentences task presented as an 
independent psycholinguistic experiment. In one condition, the majority of the sentences 
corresponded to an autonomous motivation (e.g., “he is feeling autonomous”), and in the other 
condition the majority of sentences corresponded to a controlled motivation (e.g., “he has an 
obligation”). In a second, ostensibly unrelated part of the experiment, primed motivational 
orientations produced effects that are similar to those that are usually reported when these 
motivational orientations are consciously adopted. More specifically, when participants of the 
Lévesque and Pelletier’s (2003) study were asked to solve puzzles, those primed with 
autonomous motivation expressed more interest, more choice, performed better and persevered 
longer during a subsequent crossword activity than participants primed with controlled 
motivation. Furthermore, these effects occurred without any awareness or knowledge of the 
connection between the priming task and the puzzle task as revealed in a funneled debriefing 
(see Bargh & Chartrand, 2000, for a more accurate description of this debriefing procedure).  
  Unconscious Motivational Orientation 8 
Hodgins et al.’s (2006) studies focused more specifically on the effects of autonomous 
and controlled motivation on defensiveness (i.e., protection of the self based on avoidance 
strategies). In three studies, they found that participants primed with autonomous motivation 
demonstrated less defensive attitudes (i.e., lower desire to escape, lesser self-serving bias and 
self-handicapping utilization) than participants primed with controlled motivation. Interestingly, 
their third study took place in a sport context. Participants were members of a rowing team and 
their rowing performance was assessed subsequent to the priming procedure. Their results 
indicated that participants primed with autonomous motivation rowed faster than participants 
primed with controlled motivation.  
Although these findings are consistent, indicating in both cases an assimilation of the 
primed motivational orientation, we think that additional elements are required to provide more 
compelling evidence of unconscious motivational orientations. In addition to the fact that only 
two articles reported these findings, both used the same supraliminal priming method to activate 
the construct of interest. The supraliminal priming is however not the more reliable method to 
rule out any alternatives of conscious processes. For instance, when supraliminal is used, only 
the debriefing can ensure that the effect was really unconscious. Several elements may 
nevertheless limit validity of this procedure. As Dixon (1981) pointed out, participants may 
forget a conscious thought that they had. Consciousness continuously generates thoughts, which 
are mostly not planned to be memorized and which might therefore be hard to report after a 
while. Furthermore, divergent findings have been reported when researchers primed the same 
construct using supraliminal or subliminal stimuli (e.g., Gillath, Mikulincer, Birnbaum, & 
Shaver, 2008). Therefore, at least under certain circumstances, supraliminal and subliminal 
priming does not refer to the same mechanisms (see also Merikle & Daneman, 1998).  
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The purpose of the present study is to provide more evidence that autonomous and 
controlled motivations can be automatically triggered outside of awareness by using subliminal 
stimuli. Words related to the experience of being autonomously motivated versus controlled 
were embedded in a distracting cognitive task. The effects of such primed motivational 
orientations were then examined on a new motor task requiring effort. Several behavioral 
indicators of motivation (e.g., performance, perseverance, effort, and free-choice involvement) 
were taken into account to have a more comprehensive view of the consequences of priming. 
Moreover, in order to determine the extent and the direction of the effect of primed motivational 
orientations we included a third control group, which was only primed with neutral stimuli.  
Our intent was to determine if automatically triggered motivational orientations, once 
activated, produce effects that are exactly the same as those that are consciously selected. 
Previous studies in sport and exercise contexts have shown that autonomous motivation had 
more positive consequences than controlled motivation, leading to more perseverance and less 
drop out in sport (e.g., Pelletier, Fortier, Vallerand, & Brière, 2001; Sarrazin, Vallerand, Guillet, 
Pelletier, & Cury, 2002), greater free-choice involvement and performance in exercise (e.g., 
Vansteenkiste, Simons, Soenens, & Lens, 2004), more effort and performance in physical 
education (e.g., Boiché, Sarrazin, Grouzet, Pelletier, & Chanal, 2008), and higher participation in 
optional physical education activities (Ntoumanis, 2005).  
Based on these findings, we expected that participants primed with autonomous 
motivation would (1) persevere more and that they would invest more effort during the learning 
period of the new motor task, (2) that they would perform better in a performance test and that 
they would persist longer in a free-choice period, and finally, (3) that they would report more 
interest and more satisfaction of their need for autonomy, in comparison to participants primed 
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with controlled motivation. We also expected that the scores of the control group on these 
dependent variables would end up between the two experimental groups on all indicators of 
motivation. In other words, we expected a linear pattern for all our results.  
Method 
Participants 
The initial sample consisted of 75 French undergraduates students (30 females and 45 
males: M = 20.5 ± 1.3 years) from the Sport Sciences department of the University of Grenoble, 
who participated on a voluntary basis. All of these participants had never practiced the 
experimental motor task, as attested by a preliminary question. They were randomly divided into 
three equal groups depending on the experimental conditions. The distribution of females and 
males was balanced within these groups. Approval of the study protocol was obtained from the 
ethics committee of the university. 
Procedure 
Participants were informed that they would take part in two unrelated experiments. Since 
several academic disciplines are taught in the faculty of sport sciences, participants were told that 
the first experiment was related to psychology and the second one to physiology. In order to 
increase the realism of this cover story, two different (but adjacent) rooms and two different 
experimenters were used. Participants completed the experimental session individually. Prior to 
completing the experimental session, a consent form which included a description of the 
experimental tasks was completed by participants. 
The priming task. Upon entering the laboratory, participants met the physiology 
experimenter (the experimenter’s gender was matched to the participant’s gender). The 
experimenter then set up the cardiac sensor required for the physiology experiment while 
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participants were waiting for the arrival of the experimenter for the psychology experiment. 
Then, the experimenter led participants into the psychology room experiment. They were seated 
in front of a computer and were asked to wait quietly for the psychology experimenter. Three 
minutes after, he/she entered the room and explained that the goal of the experiment was to 
examine memorization processes and described the experimental task to the participant. All 
instructions were provided by a computer endowed with a cathodic screen set at a 15 ms refresh 
rate, and with E-Prime® software. Participants were asked to identify as soon as possible if two 
pictures were the same or if they were different. A computer function randomly assigned 
participants to one of the three conditions: autonomous motivation, controlled motivation, or 
neutral (N = 25 in each condition). The procedure ensured that the experimenter was kept 
unaware of participants’ priming condition. A subliminal word was inserted just before each 
picture was displayed. Words were randomly chosen by the software to produce a series of four 
words. In the autonomous condition, the words were: envie, volonté, liberté, choisir (desire, 
willing, freedom, chose). In the controlled condition the words were: contraint, obligation, 
devoir, obéir (constrained, obligation, duty, obey). Words were chosen according to the previous 
studies using words to characterize motivational orientations (e.g., Lévesque & Pelletier, 2003; 
Ryan & Connell, 1989). In accordance with many priming studies (e.g., Aarts, Chartrand, 
Custers, Danner, Dik, Jefferis et al. 2005) primes for the control group were strings of letters 
without meanings to avoid the activation of unwanted constructs which could be primed if 
meaningful words were used as neutral primes. 
A total of 92 primes for each condition were displayed. Subliminal words were flashed in 
the parafoveal vision area (see Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). For that, a fixation point located at the 
center of the screen was used before the prime and the location of the prime was randomly 
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presented in one of the four quadrants of the screen (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996). The stimulus 
word was presented for 45 ms and was immediately followed by a 60 ms mask (i.e., “apmsgz”) 
at the same location. A trial began with a 1 s. fixation point followed by the prime and the mask, 
and the first picture for 5 s. Then, the same fixation point came back followed by the prime and 
the mask which appeared just before the second picture. This one disappeared when participants 
answered. The trial finished with feedback indicating only the response time in order to avoid 
feelings of success or failure. This task consisted of 46 trials and the average time for the 
completion was about 12 min. When the task was completed, participants were thanked and 
asked to leave the room.  
The motor task. Immediately after participants left the room, they were led into the other 
room by the physiology experimenter. A hidden camcorder recorded all the sessions in this 
room. Participants were told that the purpose of this experiment was to study the relationship 
between cardiovascular and muscular activity. They were asked to learn how to use a 
powerball® in a 15 min. period, with the help of two pedagogic documents: a 55 seconds video 
and a poster indicating tips for quickly learning this activity. The powerball® is a gyroscopic 
exercise task which consists of a tennis ball-sized plastic shell around a free-spinning mass (i.e., 
the rotor). It works without electricity starting with a string impulsion. A circular movement of 
the wrist maintains and accelerates the spinning of the powerball®. Then, the activity quickly 
becomes physical, as a strong resistance appears when the rotor speed increases.  
This motor task was chosen because (a) it was unknown to participants, therefore no a 
priori motivation could be associated with it, (b) it gives a reliable score of performance via a 
digital counter, (c) it requires sufficient physical effort to record physiological variations, and (d) 
as a function of prime, it can be either related to “fun” features because this entertaining sport 
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instrument delivers sensations and emits sound and light, or either to “tedious” features because 
its use is drudgery at the beginning and quickly tiring afterward. In order words, the participant 
had the possibility to experience the activity as either a challenge and/or a fun discovery (i.e., 
autonomous motivation) or as a constraint and/or an obligation (controlled motivation).  
At the end of the learning period, the experimenter came back and asked participants to 
perform two trials using a performance test. They were asked to rotate the powerball® as fast as 
possible. Then, the experimenter left participants alone under the pretext that he/she no longer 
had a copy of the printed questionnaire. During this time, participants were given the possibility 
to practice the activity again or to read a magazine. The initiation of an activity freely and 
without any external pressures has been used many times to assess self-determined motivation in 
different contexts (see Deci & Ryan, 1985) including sport and exercise (see Vallerand & 
Fortier, 1998, for a review). Four minutes later, the experimenter returned into the room and 
gave a form to the participant containing items assessing intrinsic motivation and the satisfaction 
of the need for autonomy. 
 Finally, as part of the debriefing, the experimenter carefully probed for any suspicions 
regarding the relation between the two tasks with a funneled questionnaire protocol (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000). Four questions were verbally asked: (1) Can you precisely indicate what were 
the purposes of both experiments?, (2) Do you think that the two experiments were related to 
each other?, (3) Do you think that what you did in the first experiment influenced your 
involvement in the second task?, and (4) Did you notice something unusual during the computer 
task of the psychology experiment?. If a participant indicated a positive answer to one of the 
three last questions, he/she was asked to give a detailed answer. Then, the experimenter asked 
why participants performed the motor task. Finally, the experimenter revealed the true purpose 
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of the study and provided explanations justifying the use of a masked presentation of the 
experiment in order to minimize deception. A second informed consent summarizing these 
points and asking permission for data use was provided to the participants. 
Measures 
 Performance on the motor task. A digital counter situated on the shell of the powerball® 
indicated the speed rotation of the rotor in rotations per minute (RPM). Only the best score of the 
two trials for the performance test was maintained. 
 Perseverance during learning period. From video-recorded material, a judge blind to the 
conditions counted the amount of time (in seconds) during which the participant used the 
powerball®. 
 Involvement during the free-choice period. The same judge, counted the total time (in 
seconds) that participants used the powerball® during the free-choice period. 
 Invested effort during the learning period. Given the linear relation between the intensity 
of work and heart rate (e.g., Astrand & Rodahl, 1986), an index of energy resources provided by 
the participant to train on the powerball® was given by the increasing percentage between the 
resting heart rate and the mean heart rate during the training period (e.g., Sarrazin, Roberts, 
Cury, Biddle, & Famose, 2002). Thus, this index provided a control for individual differences in 
heart rate and took into consideration the effort invested during the total time of the training 
period. The heart rate was continuously recorded with an ambulatory device (Actiheart® sensor; 
Cambridge Neurotechnology Ltd). This lightweight instrument was strapped onto the chest. The 
data were analyzed by the program provided with the instrument (Actiheart® version 2.2 
software). The resting heart rate value was obtained when the participant was waiting for the 
psychology experimenter at the beginning of the study.  
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 Interest/Enjoyment. Eight items (e.g., “I enjoyed this activity very much”, α = .83) of the 
subscale of the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI; Ryan, 1982) assessed the individual’s 
perception of interest-enjoyment with the motor task. Participants answered these items on a 7-
point Likert scale, ranging from (1) “do not agree at all” to (7) “completely agree”.  
 Autonomy satisfaction. The autonomy (e.g., “I felt free to exercise in my own way”, α = 
.82) subscale of the French version of the Needs Satisfaction Scale adapted for sport and exercise 
settings (Gillet, Rosnet, & Vallerand, 2008) was used. This subscale includes five items rated on 
a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from (1) “do not agree at all” to (7) “completely agree”.  
Data Analyses 
Four participants (5.33%) expressed some suspicion about the experimental manipulation 
and were removed from the analyses. Two of them suspected that the two experiments were not 
completely independent and two reported seeing blinking on the screen and then hypothesized 
the use of a subliminal technique. Thus, all participants in the final sample were unaware of the 
experimental manipulation as they indicated (1) similar study purposes as those told by the 
experimenters, (2) no relationship between the two experiments, and (3) no notable elements in 
the first experiment.  
 We first examined whether a multivariate effect was induced by the priming manipulation 
using a generalized linear model analysis. Then, we examined specificity and direction of the 
effect using univariate regression models. According to Rosenthal and Rosnow (2008), we 
created two contrasts to test our hypothesis. The first contrast translated into the expected linear 
effect. Specifically, we assigned weights of -1, 0, +1 respectively to the controlled, neutral, and 
autonomous conditions. The second contrast was a quadratic contrast, orthogonal to the first one 
(i.e., the controlled, autonomous, and neutral conditions were respectively assigned the weights 
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of -1, -1, and +2). This second contrast had no specific meaning relative to our hypotheses, but it 
allowed us to examine the potential existence of a residual effect after controlling for the 
variance explained by the first contrast. Two criteria are indeed required to conclude the 
presence of the expected linear effect: (1) the linear contrast is significant, (2) the quadratic 
contrast representing the residual variance is non-significant (e.g., Brauer & McClelland, 2005; 
Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008). Given that perseverance during the learning period and 
involvement during the free-choice period presented an asymmetric distribution (skewness > 
2), a reverse transformation (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006) was conducted on these two 
variables, which rectified the deviation from normality (skewness < 1).  
 Results 
Table 1 displays zero-order correlation of all dependent variables. Logically, the longer 
participants practiced the motor task during the learning period, the higher their mean heart-rate 
was (r = .28, p < .05). Self-reported interest and enjoyment for the motor task was highly 
correlated with the self-reported autonomy satisfaction (r = .72, p < .001), and marginally 
correlated with performance (r = .21, p < .10) and involvement during the free-choice period (r 
= .20, p < .10).  
 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of all dependent variables. For the sake of clarity, we 
present non-transformed means. Results of the multivariate analyses reveal a significant effect of 
a linear contrast, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.69, F(6, 63) = 4.83, p < .001, and a non-significant effect of 
a quadratic contrast, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.91, F(6, 63) = 0.97, p =.45. Six multiple hierarchical 
regression analyses were then performed for each motivational measure. In the first step of each 
regression analysis, dependent variables (DV) were regressed onto linear contrasts to test our 
hypothesis. In the second step, the quadratic contrast was entered in order to test the residual 
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effect after controlling for the variance explained by the linear contrast. Results obtained from 
these analyses are presented in Table 3. They reveal that (1) linear contrast significantly predicts 
all DVs in the study, ts (68) > 2.12, ps < .05, and (2) quadratic contrast is systematically non-
significant, ts (68) < 1.72, ps > .10 and explains no additional variance after controlling for the 
variance explained by the linear contrast, Fs change < 2.90, p >.10. In others words, each time 
the main part of the variance is explained by the first linear contrast. Clearly, participants primed 
with autonomous motivation performed better, invested more effort, persisted longer during the 
learning period and during the free-choice period, reported more interest and enjoyment for the 
activity and reported a higher level of autonomy, than participants primed with controlled 
motivation. As expected and as indicated in Table 2, scores of the neutral condition participants 
on all of these dependent variables were located between the two primed groups. 
Discussion 
The SDT is one contemporary theory that has become very popular in sport and exercise 
psychology research. For example, articles inspired by this theory represent 12% of the total 
research published in the Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology in the last three years. Its 
success can certainly be explained by the meaningful distinction between autonomous and 
controlled motivations. This distinction has indeed demonstrated a powerful predictor of a wide 
range of consequences in sport and exercise such as among others, perseverance (e.g., Pelletier et 
al., 2001), free involvement (e.g., Vansteenkiste et al., 2004), and effort and performance 
(Boiché et al., 2008). Because SDT, like many other motivational theories, mainly relies on 
conscious processes, it is usually presumed that the motivational orientation adopted in a new 
activity results from conscious thinking.  
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In line with recent research on unconscious autonomous and controlled motivation 
(Hodgins et al., 2006; Lévesque & Pelletier, 2003; see Lévesque, Copeland, & Sutcliffe, 2008, 
for a review), the goal of the present study was to examine if both motivational orientations 
could be automatically triggered by unconscious determinants. Using several indicators of 
motivation for exercise, we observed that the priming manipulation had a general effect on 
involvement in a new motor task. A significant linear effect was found across all dependent 
variables indicating that both autonomous and controlled motivation conditions produced 
specific outcomes compared to a neutral group. Similar to the effect that is usually reported by 
the research on SDT’s motivational orientations (see Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2007 for a review 
in sport and exercise), participants primed with an autonomous motivation displayed more 
adaptive responses while participants primed with controlled motivation displayed less adaptive 
responses in comparison to participants in the neutral condition. Specifically, when subliminal 
words displayed in an initial unrelated task referred to an autonomous motivation (e.g., wish, 
freedom) rather than a controlled motivation (e.g., constrained, duty), participants were more 
involved and invested more effort for learning a subsequent new motor task, as depicted by their 
time devoted to the activity and their increased heart rate. In addition, they performed better 
when they were evaluated and when they spent more time on the task during a free-choice 
period. Although participants were unaware of the unconscious determinants of their 
motivational orientation, results showed that they however realized the consequences generated 
by the subliminal manipulation. Participants primed with an autonomous motivation indeed 
reported more interest and enjoyment for the task and a greater satisfaction of their need for 
autonomy than those primed with a controlled motivation. 
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Although these motivational indicators account for different facets of motivation as 
shown by the relatively weak correlation between these variables, we found that the effect of the 
manipulation was consistent across all of these indicators. The consistency of the effects and the 
medium to large effect size (mean β = .30; see Table 3) provided reliable evidence that 
motivational orientations such as those suggested by SDT can be activated outside of an 
individual’s awareness. The present findings support previous studies by Lévesque and Pelletier 
(2003) and Hodgins et al. (2006) which demonstrated that supraliminal stimuli referring to 
motivational orientations subsequently influenced participants’ behaviors in the same direction 
as the primed motivational orientations. Nevertheless, our study was the first to use a subliminal 
procedure to prime motivational orientations, ruling out any alternative hypothesis of conscious 
mechanisms for explaining the priming effect (e.g., Dixon, 1981; Merikle & Daneman, 1998). 
This unconscious influence on motivation is particularly fascinating in the context of a 
new motor task. Indeed, in this specific setting, deliberative processes of the conscious system 
are typically presumed to be much more prevalent than unconscious influences. One may think 
that involvement in a motor activity has to be consciously monitored because motor activities 
require the regulation of energy. Moreover, new activities are typically presumed to be 
controlled by the conscious system. For example, Ajzen (2002) indicated that: “Novel behaviors 
and unfamiliar situations are said to evoke careful deliberation and controlled production of 
beliefs, attitudes, and intentions that direct subsequent behavior” (p.109). In spite of that, we 
observed in the present study that individuals’ motivation for a new motor task was influenced 
by unconscious processes. So one can wonder why the enhanced conscious monitoring generated 
by the new motor task did not annihilate the unconscious influences? Even though the conscious 
system is indeed able to moderate or to disrupt responses that are unconsciously selected 
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(Norman & Shallice, 1986), we think this control function did not occur because both primed 
motivation orientations would be appropriate for the task. Indeed, the conscious control function 
over unconscious influences has been reported when the impulse is not adapted to the situation, 
costly or displeasing (e.g., Macrae & Johnston, 1998). Since participants could actually adopt 
either an autonomous motivation (e.g., practice the pleasure to discover a new activity) or a 
controlled motivation (e.g., just to obey to the experimenter doing a strenuous and boring 
activity) in this task, unconscious influences were not disrupted by consciousness.  
In the future, it would be interesting to further investigate this process by examining the 
magnitude of the effect of primed motivational orientation based on the appropriateness of the 
primed motivational orientation in relation to the specific task. For example, we should examine 
if priming autonomous motivation can still work when the target activity is uninteresting and 
unnecessary for individuals or on the contrary, if priming controlled motivation can reduce 
motivation for an interesting activity. 
Future research should also more closely examine the role played by psychological needs 
in automatic activation of motivational orientation. According to SDT, it is hypothesized that the 
motivational orientation is determined by the social context via the extent to which psychological 
needs for competence, autonomy, and relatedness have been fulfilled  (see Vallerand & Losier, 
1999, for a complete description of this motivational sequence in sport). The results of the 
present study suggest that psychological needs are not the mediator with respect to the automatic 
activation of  motivational orientations as there are almost no significant correlations between 
autonomy satisfaction and motivational consequences. Although it seems possible that the 
automatic activation of motivational orientations could be linked to a stimulus without any 
mediators (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001), it is also plausible that our measure of need satisfaction 
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was simply not appropriate. Since the perception of the priming event was unconscious, it is 
possible that its impact on psychological needs was not accessible to introspection and thus, it 
could only be assessed by an implicit measure. Therefore, it appears important to determine in 
future studies whether the motivational sequence postulated by SDT is supported in the case of 
unconscious influence. 
Conclusion  
The results of the present study suggest that unconscious determinants can play a 
significant role in the activation of motivational processes. It is plausible that the results of this 
study are limited to the particular laboratory study design and therefore it is important that 
additional research be conducted to fully understand if and how unconscious motivational 
orientations could be primed in real-life settings. We hope that such findings will allow future 
research and intervention in sport and exercise psychology to pay more attention to unconscious 
influences. Perhaps that the “godlike metaphor” used by Weiner (1992) to characterize human 
functioning deserves to be replaced or completed by another one which emphasizes the 
unconscious processes. The “akratic person” (who acts against his/her better judgment to fulfill 
impulses) described by Greek philosophers could best describes the unconscious process (e.g., 
Strack & Deutsch, 2004). 
Our results can have several implications for research and applied issues in sport and 
exercise psychology. For instance, the demonstration that a motivational orientation can be, in 
part, primed by unconscious factors suggests potentially new ways to motivate athletes. 
Although subliminal means should not be used in applied settings due to the different ethical 
problems they present (Dijksterhuis et al., 2005), similar unconscious influences might be used 
to obtain the same results. For example, if athletes perceive some autonomous related elements 
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around them, it can be sufficient to predispose them to use more autonomous motivation for their 
own endeavors. Insofar as athletes agree, their environment might be structured with this 
objective in mind. For example, content of speech and coaching material might preferably 
include elements referring to autonomous motivation to prime athletes with this motivation.  
Also, we think that it is important to recognize that the priming of unconscious 
motivation may also lead to negative outcomes. For instance, the sport context includes a host of 
extrinsic cues such as fame, popularity, physical appearance, monetary prize, and so on. Since all 
of these variables are susceptible to activate controlled motivation, it is therefore plausible that 
both coaches and athletes may end up with controlled motivation without being aware of it. 
Although it may be difficult to minimize the salience of these cues, it is still important to 
recognize that they are a part of the sport system (through the media and advertisement) and that 
athletes could be primed without their awareness.  
Our results also have important methodological implications. During the funneled 
debriefing, all participants said that their involvement in the task was the result of their own 
choice. As these statements illustrated, people sometimes seem unaware of the origin of their 
behavior or involvement in an activity – a point that was suggested by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
several years ago. Wegner and Wheatley (1999) even indicated that the conscious system often 
tends to appropriately and to rationally (but falsely) justify unconscious responses. Such 
observations should lead motivational researchers to raise questions about the validity of the 
explicit measures that are used in motivational studies as such measures can sometimes ask more 
than participants really know (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Implicit measures (i.e., those which 
occur in an automatic fashion, see De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, in press) 
that take unconscious influences more into account could therefore be added to gain a more 
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comprehensive view of motivational determinants. For example, Lévesque and Pelletier (2003) 
reported that an implicit measure of motivation (i.e., chronic motivation) was more related to 
behavior whereas self-reported motivation was more related to intention. 
Lastly, we think that athletes and coaches might benefit from some of the qualities of the 
unconscious system that can optimize performance and training. Since the unconscious system is 
really efficient, it would be very interesting to entrust as many tasks as possible to this system, 
saving many cognitive resources for the task of interest. Thus, athletes might avoid choking by 
being less distracted by thoughts which are not related to their motor task. Nevertheless, research 
on unconscious processes is still in its infancy and future work is needed to fully understand both 
how unconscious motivational orientations could be primed and what consequences could follow 
from unconscious motivation when compared with conscious motivation.
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Table 1 
Zero-Order Correlations Among All Dependent Variables  
Measures 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Performance .09 .14 .08 .21† .17 
2. Perseverance -  .05   .28* .10 .13 
3. Free choice period  - .10 .20† .16 
4. Effort   - .14 .05 
5. Interest/enjoyment    - .72** 
6. Autonomy satisfaction     - 
Note: †p < .10 ; *p < .05 ; **p < .01. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Means (M) and Standard-Deviation (SD) as a Function of Priming Condition  
 Priming condition 
 Controlled Motivation 
 
Neutral 
Autonomous 
Motivation 
 M SD M SD M SD 
 
Performance (rpm) 
 
5463 
 
2436 
 
6038 
 
2062 
 
6908 
 
2196 
 
Persistence (s) 
 
721 
 
100 
 
734 
 
143 
 
785 
 
41 
 
Free-choice period (s) 
 
11 
 
25 
 
12 
 
20 
 
71 
 
85 
 
Effort (%) 
 
13.5 
 
7.6 
 
16.0 
 
7.6 
 
18.6 
 
7.9 
 
Interest/enjoyment 
 
4.2 
 
1.3 
 
4.7 
 
1.1 
 
5.1 
 
1.1 
 
Autonomy satisfaction 
 
2.0 
 
1.4 
 
2.4 
 
1.4 
 
3.3 
 
1.1 
Note: rpm = rotation per minute.
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Table 3.  
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Performance, Persistence, Free-choice 
Period, Effort, Interest/Enjoyment and Autonomy Satisfaction 
 
Variables 
 
β 
 
t 
 
F 
 
R2 
F 
change 
R2 
change 
Predicting Performance 
Step 1 
     Linear contrast 
Step 2 
     Linear contrast 
     Quadratic contrast 
 
Predicting Persistence 
Step 1 
     Linear contrast 
Step 2 
     Linear contrast 
     Quadratic contrast 
 
Predicting Free-choice period 
Step 1 
     Linear contrast 
Step 2 
     Linear contrast 
     Quadratic contrast 
 
Predicting Effort 
Step 1 
     Linear contrast 
Step 2 
     Linear contrast 
     Quadratic contrast 
 
Predicting Interest/Enjoyment 
Step 1 
     Linear contrast 
Step 2 
     Linear contrast 
     Quadratic contrast 
 
Predicting Autonomy satisfaction 
Step 1 
     Linear contrast 
Step 2 
     Linear contrast 
     Quadratic contrast 
 
 
  .26 
 
  .26 
  .03 
 
 
 
  .25 
 
  .25 
  .08 
 
 
 
  .37 
 
  .38 
  .19 
 
 
 
  .29 
 
  .29 
 -.02 
 
 
 
  .31 
 
  .31 
 -.01 
 
 
 
  .28 
 
  .29 
  .14 
 
 
  2.23* 
 
  2.21* 
  0.26 
 
 
 
  2.13* 
 
  2.13*  
  0.71 
       
 
  3.35** 
 
 3.42**  
 1.71 
 
 
 
  2.55* 
 
  2.53*  
 -0.20 
 
 
  2.70** 
 
 2.69**  
-0.05 
 
 
 
  2.46* 
 
  2.48*  
  1.20 
 
  4.96* 
 
  2.48 
 
 
 
 
  4.55* 
 
  2.52 
 
 
 
 
11.24** 
 
  7.22** 
 
 
 
 
   6.51* 
 
   3.23* 
 
 
 
 
  7.32** 
 
   3.61* 
 
 
 
 
   6.06* 
 
   3.76* 
 
 .07 
 
 .07 
 
 
 
 
 .06 
 
 .07 
 
 
 
 
 .14 
 
 .18 
 
 
 
 
 .09 
 
 .09 
 
 
 
 
 .10 
 
 .10 
 
 
 
 
 .08 
 
 .10 
 
 
 
 
 0.07 ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.52 ns  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2.89 ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.04 ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00 ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1.43 ns 
 
 
 
  .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  .007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  .035 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  .000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  .02 
Note: N = 71. df for Step 1 = 1, 69; df for Step 2 = 2, 68; *p < .05;**p < .01, ns = non-significant. 
 
